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failed to act.

It is undisputed that Gilbert did not redeem the

property in his name in 1947.

The last deed of record prior to

Gilbert's deed to himself and Maud in 1976 is the 1940 deed to
Gilbert and Robert from Summit County.

Gilbert and Maud admitted

the existence of Robert's interest and contradicted their testimony

in

the

themselves.
Kimball)

legal

description

(See Exhibits

portion

9 and

11

of

two

1976 deeds

- Deposition

of

to

Gilbert

The Court admits the facts upon which it bases the

laches decision are assumptions in discussing Robert's failure to
act: "If Robert believed . . . "

clearly identifies this Court's

opinion of Robert's failure as based on an assumption of notice
and a failure to act.
At the trial Maud Kimball and Gary Kimball fabricated the
statements

allegedly

made

by

Robert; plainly,

they

committed

perjury.
Maud testified that she was personally present during the
19 47 discussion and the opinion of the Court cites her statement
as truthful.

But in Maud's deposition she testified she was not

personally present and did not hear the alleged statement. (Maud
Kimball deposition p. 21f line 23).

Maud committed perjury by

testifying that she was present and heard the Robert's statement.
She

claimed

knowledge

of a tax sale that never occurred and

Robert's alleged presence in the State was clearly rebutted when
Elizabeth Kimball testified Robert did not travel to Utah during
that period of time or in 1947.

-2-
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Gary Kimball testified he heard and remembered a discussion
in 1953 between his father and Robert.

Gilbert Kimball testified

the last discussion between he and Robert was the 1947 discussion
and Elizabeth Kimball testified that Robert could not have been
present in Park City in 1953 because he was not in the State of
Utah that year.

Gary Kimball fabricated the entire conversation

in an attempt to further his own interests.
Elizabeth Kimball testified that her husband was not even in
the State of Utah (or Park City) during the years 1947 and 1953.
Robert Kimball was not present in the State of Utah and could not
have heard any statement by Gilbert, have made a statement to
Gilbert or have been placed on notice by any verbal statement by
Gilbert during either 1947 or 1953.

There was no evidence of a

tax redemption in Gilbert's name in 1947 and Robert could not be
placed on notice by an event that never occurred, Gilbert and
Maud admitted to Robert's interest in the 1976 deeds to themselves and Elizabeth Kimball clearly testified that Robert was
not even in the State in 1947 or 1953.

The finding of laches

against the Robert Kimball interest in completely and totally
unsupported by any factual basis on the record.
B.

ESTOPPEL

The Court also finds that Robert Kimball's successors in
interest are estopped to assert the property interest of Robert
Kimball.

The factual basis for the claim of estoppel apparently

the disputed evidence of Robert's renouncement of interest and
Gilbert's

continued

payment

of

property

tax.
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There

is

no

evidence of any expenditure of time or money on the property with
the exception of the payment of taxes, there is no evidence of
any improvement to the property, there is no evidence of any act
by Gilbert Kimball or his successors in interest which Gilbert
Kimball would not otherwise have done.

Gilbert Kimball and Maud

Kimball testified that they purchased the property in Gilbert's
name in 1947 and that the property no longer carried Robert's
name after that time; there was no reason for Gilbert and Maud to
rely

on

Robert's

renouncement

of

interest.

The

opinion

of

the Court states that the Kimball's relied on Robert's renouncement of interest.
telling

Why?

Clearly, if Gilbert and Maud Kimball are

the truth, there was no reason

for them

to rely on

Robert's renouncement of interest in the property.

They simply

could rely upon the deed to themselves from the County after the
purported tax sale.
It has been the position of Elizabeth Kimball and Melvin
Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher that Robert Kimball never renounced
his interest or verbally surrendered his interest in the property
to Gilbert Kimball.

(The Statute of Frauds U.C.A. 25-5-1 (1953

as amended) prevents unwritten surrenders of interests in real
property.)

The statements by Gilbert and Maud Kimball and Gary

Kimball are pure fabrications.

The repudiation of interest did

not occur and by the Kimball's own testimony the repudiation of
interest could not be detrimental to them because they believed,
if we believe their testimony, that they purchased the property
in Gilbert's name in 1947.
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Gilbert and Maud Kimball testified that they received legal
advice on how to proceed in the absence of a deed from Robert.
Apparently Gilbert and Maud Kimball did not do what they were
advised to do by their legal advisor because the property remained in the name of Gilbert and Robert up to the present time.
The testimony by Gilbert and Maud Kimball creates the fact that
there could be no estoppel in this situation because they did not
rely on Robert's statements or renouncement of interest and they
did nothing based on Robert's purported

statements which they

would not have done in the absence of the purported statements.
At the time of his deposition, Gilbert Kimball knew where
Robert Kimball's widow lived in Salt Lake City.

He testified in

his deposition that he knew Robert had a son living in Salt Lake
City.

During Gilbert's deposition counsel for the Respondents

pointed out to Gilbert that there was no deed or document placing
title to the property in his name alone.

Following that deposi-

tion , the Kimball's counsel executed an affidavit in support of a
motion for publication for service of summons as he initiated the
quiet title portion of the Kimball's claim.

The Kimballs did not

make an effort to find Elizabeth Kimball in Salt Lake City even
though it was clear from the record that Robert Kimball's interest has survived over time.

The Kimballs clearly tried to not

serve the successors in interest to Robert Kimball personally
with process to put them on notice of the quiet title matter.
The Kimballs committed perjury in an attempt to support laches
and estoppel defenses to the successors in interest of Robert
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Kimball,

The opinion of the Court rewards this reprehensible

conduct by awarding the entire property to Maud and Gary Kimball.
C.

PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT
Prior to the purchase of Elizabeth Kimball's interest by

Melvin and Peggy Fletcher, the pleadings in the case filed by
former

counsel

pled

a

prescriptive

easement

arising

in

the

Fletchers by virtue of the continued use and possession of the
property adverse to Gilbert and Robert Kimball for a period of
more than thirty years.
It is essential for the Court to understand that the property
purchased by Melvin and Peggy Fletcher from their predecessors in
interest

is separate

but

adjacent

owned by Roy Fletcher, Melvinfs

to the property

father.

previously

The Kimball property

adjoins the Roy Fletcher property at the rear and the separate
Melvin Fletcher property at the rear.
The opinion of the Court apparently defeats the prescriptive
easement of Melvin Fletcher to use the Kimball property at the
rear of his property for access to his home by relying on certain
statements by Melvinfs brother and sister which apply only to the
Roy Fletcher property and not to the Melvin Fletcher property.
Both Juanita Fletcher Love and Marion Fletcher prepared written
statements defining the extent of the permission their father Roy
enjoyed to cross the Kimball property.

Neither Marion Fletcher

nor Juanita Fletcher Love ever claimed that Melvin Fletcher had
or has permission to cross the Kimball property from the property
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which he and Peggy Fletcher separately own as distinguished from
the Roy Fletcher property•
The Court's opinion misapprehends the facts with respect to
the Fletcher's predecessors.

Apparently the Court believes the

Marion Fletcher and Juanita Fletcher Love statements are material.
Mary Workman, not Roy Fletcher, is the predecessor of Melvin and
Peggy Fletcher and therefore Roy's consent has no bearing on the
adverse use by Melvin and Peggy.
Until the conclusion of the trial below and the opinion of
this Court, no party knew who owned the property to the rear of
the Mel Fletcher home; the smaller 98 x 77 foot description was
alleged

to be controlling by the owners of the Sweeney Land

Company and a large gap (30 feet) existed between the 98 x 77
foot parcel and the parcel to the North purchased by Sweeney Land
Company from the Silver King Mining Company.

It was across this

gap which Gilbert and Maud

in

Kimball claimed

1976 that Mel

Fletcher continued to enjoy access to his home for over thirty
years.

The opinion of the Court now apparently assumes that Mel

Fletcher had the permission of an unknown owner for a thirty year
period of time and is foreclosed from asserting a prescriptive
easement

to

the

land

on

which

his

garage, outbuildings

and

driveway now rest.
It is clear that the prescriptive easement enjoyed by Melvin
Fletcher
having

and

Peggy

to do with

Fletcher

is

a

separate

property

interest

a separate and distinct property

from the

property described by Marion Fletcher and Juanita Fletcher Love
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in their statements to Gilbert Kimball.

The statements regarding

Roy Fletcher's consentual use of the Kimball property have no
bearing on the nature of Mel and Peggy Fletcher's use of the
property to the rear of their home which is not the home of Roy
Fletcher.

It is also clear that until a judicial finding was

entered of the accuracy of the 1976 Kimball deed, all of the
parties to this dispute understood that no clear record interest
v/as vested in Gilbert or Maud Kimball with respect to the property
between the

98 x 77 foot parcel and the parcel purchased by

Sweeney Land Company from the Silver King Mines;

approximately a

30 foot gap existed between those two parcels and it is this
property which Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher have used for
access to their property and for their garage and other outbuildings for more than thirty years.

POINT II
THE OPINION FAILS TO FOLLOW THE STANDARD FOR THE
REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF THE TRIAL COURTS AS
MANDATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Trial Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and a Decree of Quiet Title and Partition as required by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Findings of Fact were based

on the Trial Court's observations of the witnesses and a review
of the documentary and testimentary evidence available to it.
The opinion of the Court correctly

states the Rule that

Findings of Fact should not be set aside unless they are clearly
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erroneous.

The clearly erroneous standard requires that there be

no evidence to support the Findings of Fact.
In Acton vs. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, (Utah 1987) the Supreme
Court of Utah provided the most comprehensive guidance concerning
the requirements of the trial courts to enter Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.

Differences of interpretation

in the

facts should be resolved in favor of the judgment of the trial
court who had the opportunity to view the witnesses and their
candor while on the witness stand.

Here the main opinion exer-

cises a substitution of a judgment of the Appellate Court for the
judgment of the trial court.

Throughout the main opinion the

Court assumes that the statements attributed to Robert W. Kimball
were in fact made by Robert Kimball and were true.

The Court

overlooks the internal inconsistency of the testimony and the
contradiction

of

testimony

Elizabeth

of

the

testimony
Kimball.

by

documentary

Where

the

evidence

evidence

must

and
be

weighed by a finder of fact, deference should be given to the
trial judge and the trial judge should be sustained.
The main opinion fails to sustain the findings of the trial
court where

the evidence was

contradictory, rebutted

ternally inconsistent.

-9- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and in-

POINT III
THE OPINION MISSTATES THE LAW OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The

Statute

of

Frauds

25-5-1

(U.C.A.

1953, as

amended)

requires that no interest in land may be surrendered unless in
writing.

This rule is intended to prevent frauds being perpe-

trated on the public and the courts
involving real property.

in the trial of matters

It is uncontroverted that there is no

writing surrendering or transferring the interests of Robert W.
Kimball to Gilbert or Maud Kimball.
The only exception to the Statute of Frauds requirement that
such matters be in writing is the principle of promissory estoppel as described in Monarco vs. LoGreco, 220 P.2d 737 (1950).

In

Monarco v LoGreco the Supreme Court of California enforced an
orally created interest in land.

In that case the Plaintiff had

worked an entire lifetime on a farm as a result of a promise that
the farm would be left to him by his stepparents.

The enormous

degree of harm to the Plaintiff was weighed against the interest
of the State in requiring that all interests conveying land be in
writing.
of

This landmark case sets the standard for the creation

promissory

estoppel

and

the

principal

ingredient

is

the

detrimental reliance and conduct in furtherance in the reliance
on an oral promise.
In the present case there is no conduct in reliance of the
nature demonstrated in Monarco v LoGreco.

The conduct of Gilbert
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and Maud Kimball demonstrates no change in the course of dealing
of the parties.

First of all, the oral represention must be

uncontroverted.

It must have been made and the parties must

agree that it was made.
oral

statement

Second, there must be reliance on the

and, third,

that

reliance

must

result

to the

detriment of the party who has relied on the statement.

In the

present case it simply is not clear that an oral renouncement of
the property interest of Robert W. Kimball ever occurred.

In

fact, the overwhelming weight of the evidence is that it did not
occur.

Maud

and

Gilbert

Kimball

did

nothing

to

demonstrate

reliance and the elements of promissory estoppel to establish an
exception to the Statute of Frauds are not present.
CONCLUSION
This case clearly should be remanded to the Trial Court for
entry of Findings of Fact sufficient to clarify the reasoning of
the Court with respect to the application of the doctrines of
laches and estoppel.
to reconcile

The Trial Court should also be instructed

the oral

finding of the Court with

the written

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by making additional
findings

which

However,

the

further

Trial

delineate

Court

should

the
not

verdict
be

of

directed

determined result by this Court.
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the
to

Court.
a

pre-

